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THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY
Franklin I. Gamwell*
INTRODUCTION
During the past half-century, U.S. politics have been increasingly
troubled by their proper relation to religion, in part because of the
greater diversity among our nation's religions and the greater conse-
quence of government in everyday life. In addition, attention to this
relationship has been heightened by the effective emergence in na-
tional politics of conservative Christian communities, with their un-
abashed public appeal to religious teachings, and more recently by the
religious allusions in talk of a "clash of civilizations," including a so-
called "axis of evil."
Simultaneous with and connected to this long-standing public con-
cern, the issue has focused a lively academic discussion. It has been
prominent in religious studies at least since Sidney Mead published
The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America in
1963 and, not long after, Robert Bellah introduced us to Civil Religion
in America.' But these works initiated simply one thread in a fabric of
discussion that, for some fifty years, has included scholars in history,
sociology, law, philosophy, and theology-and, along the way, has
aided the creation of several centers and programs designed to study,
in one way or another, religion and public life. On my accounting, the
persistent attempts to clarify how democracy treats religion testify
that matters of fundamental and abiding importance in both politics
and religion are involved. Although the points debated, both in the
academy and the larger public, are protean, there is virtually unani-
mous agreement in both venues on the following: Democracy as a
form of political community requires, at least in the United States,
religious freedom. Precisely what religious freedom means and why it
is essential are themselves matters of disagreement. Among other
reasons, the answers may differ, because some thinkers focus, as I will
* Shailer Mathews Distinguished Service Professor of Religious Ethics, The Divinity School,
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1. SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA
(1963); Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 21 (Russell
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here, on democratic theory and others, as I will not, on constitutional
jurisprudence in the United States. 2 Still, there is almost complete
consensus that something like the initial clauses of the First Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution must be coherently reaffirmed in any
credible account of our democracy.3
Summarily speaking, the theoretical discussion has been dominated
by accounts of two major kinds, which may be called separationist and
religionist. Although representatives of each kind disagree in signifi-
cant ways among themselves, these summary kinds are adequate for
present purposes, because, I will argue, each in its general character is
problematic; thus, the alternative to both, which I will subsequently
present, is needed. An initial word about the term "religion" may be
useful. Given that religious freedom is a sine qua non of democracy,
any democratic theory requires some definition of what is protected
by that constitutional provision. The discussion of politics and relig-
ion is the more complicated, because too little attention is given to this
definition. Instead, thinkers often take some or other designation of
the relevant beliefs and activities to be commonly accepted and suffi-
cient to consider alternative accounts.4 The proper class of protected
convictions is different than many other proposals assert or assume,
and I will later seek to identify it. But the difference does not affect
the critique of separationist and religionist accounts I will present, so
that attention to how religion should be defined may be postponed.
Given religious freedom, some conclude that politics must be con-
stitutionally separated from religious convictions, where "separated"
requires that political principles be independent, explicitly or implic-
itly, of any such conviction. On this view, that separation is what con-
stitutional disestablishment means. Thus, a citizen's pledge of
allegiance to the constitution is her commitment to refrain from or
restrain reliance on religious beliefs when she deliberates about justice
and engages in political activity. Although a given thinker may, in one
way or another, qualify the assertion, religion is, at least in the last
analysis or with respect to some central kind of governmental activi-
ties, properly left outside the political process or is nonpolitical. Rob-
2. For the difference between these two approaches, see generally STEVEN D. SMITH, FORE-
ORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
(1995).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See, e.g.. CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002):
Robert Audi, Liberal Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics, in ROBERT AUDI &
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CON-
ViCTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 1 (1997): Jfirgen Habermas. Religion in the Public Sphere, 14
EUR. J. PHIL. 1 (2006).
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ert Audi, for instance, defends a "principle of secular rationale,"
which requires that citizens have "adequate secular reason" for advo-
cating or supporting "any law or public policy that restricts human
conduct"-that is, reason independent of "a religious proposition." '5
Another expression occurs in Ronald Dworkin's endorsement of "a
tolerant secular state," 6 in which two principles that "together define
the basis and conditions of human dignity" are affirmed: "that every
human life is of intrinsic potential value" and "that everyone has a
responsibility for realizing that value in his own life."' 7 The two princi-
ples are mirrored in Dworkin's distinction, not often drawn in com-
mon speech, between ethics and morality: "Our ethical convictions
define what we should count as a good life for ourselves; our moral
principles define our obligations and responsibilities to other people.' '8
"Religious values," as he calls them, are one kind of ethical values;
that is, a religion has to do with what counts as a good life for those
who accept it. Hence, freedom of religion is, for Dworkin, "one case
of a more general right not simply of religious but of ethical free-
dom. '" But, if religious values are ethical in Dworkin's sense, it fol-
lows that moral principles, by which decisions about justice are
properly guided, are separated from religious convictions-as is con-
firmed when Dworkin argues for the two principles of human dignity
independently of any given ethical values.10 He thereby implies that,
in the end, citizens who are religious adherents should accept that po-
litical decisions require justification in terms of these two independent
principles.
As this brief review indicates, the separationist position includes, on
the one hand, what a properly democratic constitution stipulates and,
on the other, the consequences for how citizens should pursue or un-
derstand justice as decided within the constituted political process.
Democracy constitutionally separates politics from religion; therefore,
citizens in pursuit of justice should not rely on their religious beliefs
or, at least, should recognize that other reasons must be sufficient to
warrant activities of the state. The restraint or recognition thereby
prescribed has been widely criticized. In one way or another, thinkers
such as Christopher Eberle and Nicholas Wolterstorff argue-again,
sometimes with qualifications-that this prescription is inconsistent
5. Audi, supra note 4, at 25-26 (emphasis omitted).
6. RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE 57 (2006).
7. Id. at 10.
8. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 61.
10. See id. at 11-15.
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with religious freedom.11 On this critique, summarily restated, a relig-
ion defines for its adherents the ultimate ground on which the worth
of human life in all of its expressions depends and, thereby, the en-
compassing context by which all moral and political judgments of
those adherents should be informed. Hence, democratic participation
separated from one's religious beliefs, or the affirmation that reasons
independent of them can be sufficient to determine the goodness or
rightness of political decisions, is inconsistent with those religious be-
liefs. As Wolterstorff made the point, "when we bring into the picture
people for whom it is a matter of religious conviction that they ought
to strive for a religiously integrated existence-then especially, though
not only then, does the unfairness of the liberal [or, in my terms, sepa-
rationist] position to religion come to light."'1 2 Any separationist re-
quirement is, in truth, a denial of every such religious conviction and
thus a delegitimation of what religious freedom legitimates.
This critique by religionists is convincing. Still, those who advance
it typically focus on the kinds of deliberation and debate proper within
the democratic process and do not ask about the moral authorization
of democracy itself.13 Typically, they take institutions of democratic
decision making and associated rights of citizens for granted and seem
to imply that constitutional principles stipulating this form of politics,
in distinction from activities of the state democratically determined,
may or should be separated from any given religious belief. For in-
stance, Eberle defended "the claim that a citizen is morally permitted
to support (or oppose) a coercive law even if he has only a religious
rationale for that law."' 14 But Eberle simply asserted that his "dispute
with the justificatory liberal [or, in my terms, separationist] . . . has
nothing to do with the sort of legal rights we should accord to citizens
in a liberal democracy." 15 On this point, he continued, "I believe...
that a responsible citizen in a liberal democracy adheres to character-
istic liberal institutions and practices. Of particular importance, I be-
lieve . . . that a responsible citizen will affirm the right to religious
freedom."' 6 So far as I can see, Eberle never discussed the moral ba-
sis for those institutions and practices, and, in this regard, he appears
11. See EBERLE, supra note 4; Nicholas Wolterstorff, The Role of Religion in Decision and
Discussion of Political Issues, in ROBERT AUDI & NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 67 (1997).
12. Wolterstorff, supra note 11, at 116.
13. On my reading, this is the case with both Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff. See
Audi, supra note 4: Wolterstorff. supra note 11.
14. EBERLE, supra note 4, at 10.
15. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
16. Id.
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to have only two alternatives: Either the constitutive features of lib-
eral democracy themselves depend on a particular religious rationale,
or those constitutive features are independent of all religions. In the
former case, it is not clear how, on his proposal, citizens who do not
affirm that rationale can responsibly affirm religious freedom, be-
cause, for Eberle, religious beliefs do not admit of "independent con-
firmation." 17 Alternatively, if constitutive democratic features are
independent of any religious rationale, then the moral authorization
of democracy itself is separated from all religions.
In any event, the reach of the religionist critique includes a demo-
cratic constitution. As the affirmation of some or other encompassing
context on which the worth of life depends, a religious belief concerns
the worth of all human life. Hence, a religious believer cannot con-
sistently allow that any moral or political principle can be independent
of the god, transcendent reality, or whatever else defines the ultimate
context of worth. She cannot pledge allegiance to democracy itself
without believing that its very constitutional principles depend on the
same ultimate ground. But, once this more radical consequence be-
comes apparent, one can appreciate why separationists find their crit-
ics implausible. Religionists, the countercharge contends, fail to
explicate how politics can be constituted in a manner properly neutral
to the religious diversity that religious freedom legitimates. Because
democracy as a form of government is said to depend on an ultimate
ground of worth, religionists imply the constitutive need for a com-
mon religion, that is, a religious establishment. 18 Thus, both separa-
tionists and religionists indict each other for so understanding politics
and religion that religious freedom is denied. This apparent standoff
between them is at least one important reason why the issue continues
to be a lively subject of debate, both in the larger public and in the
academy. Each side commends itself by effectively disclosing the
other's problems, which also means that neither can command the
field.
The preceding has been a cursory review of recent separationist and
religionist positions and has not attended to the subtle ways in which
representatives on either side purport to meet the other's objections.
Still, the more extended critical analysis many of these thinkers merit
17. Id. at 280.
18. This is, in effect, Dworkin's argument. For him, the alternative to a "tolerant secular
state" is a "tolerant religious state." See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 56-57. John Rawls has also
famously argued that coercive imposition of a comprehensive doctrine can be avoided only by
"freestanding" constitutional principles. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3-46 (1993)
[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
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would not, I am persuaded, revise the conclusion that another propo-
sal, differing with both sides on whatever basic theoretical commit-
ment or commitments lead to the standoff, is needed. This Article
presents such a proposal and then identifies what I take to be the the-
oretical commitment shared by current separationists and religionists
that prevents a coherent affirmation of religious freedom.
I will pursue the alternative by asking, on the one hand, about the
moral ground for a democratic constitution and, on the other, about
justice as the aim of politics so constituted and thus the kinds of delib-
eration and debate proper therein. As separationists assert and reli-
gionists at least imply, these are related questions, but they are, as I
intend them, also distinct in the manner that a constitution is distinct
from statutory law. Both questions are expressed in speaking of "the
question of democracy," because this is an ambiguous phrase. On the
one hand, it may be an objective genitive, so that it means the question
about democracy, and may be formulated as follows: What, if any-
thing, morally authorizes the form of political community a properly
democratic constitution provides? On the other hand, the genitive
may be subjective, in which case it means democracy's question and
may be formulated as follows: What defines the justice of statutory
laws and policies at which democratic deliberation aims?
I will not seek here to argue for the moral authorization of demo-
cratic politics or for a substantive principle of democratic justice. My
thesis, rather, is this: If democracy itself is morally authorized, both a
democratic constitution and the justice that democratic deliberation
properly pursues depend on ultimate terms of political assessment, the
kind of encompassing context for evaluation that religions typically
purport to make explicit. The class of convictions protected by relig-
ious freedom is, I will argue, more inclusive than religion in the strict
sense, and, given use of "religious" to designate this more extensive
class, the thesis may be restated: If democracy is morally authorized,
valid answers to both the question about democracy and democracy's
question depend on valid religious grounds. In that respect, I agree
with religionists. As democracy itself requires, however, I also intend
to agree with separationists in the following respect: The constitution
of a democratic state, and thus the laws and policies effected by the
democratic process, should be neutral to all religious beliefs in the
extended sense.
II. THE QUESTION ABOUT DEMOCRACY
I begin with the first way in which democracy is a question. Demo-
cratic politics is one among different possibilities for political rule-
[Vol. 57:9971002
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including, to mention historical alternatives, monarchy and aristoc-
racy-and one may properly ask for the moral ground of democratic
rule and, in that sense, ask about democracy as a form of political
community. Doing so transparently requires some fitting definition of
democratic politics. At least on the reading of Samuel H. Beer, those
who designed the American republic were acutely aware of relevant
alternatives and acutely self-conscious about their distinctive choice.
Whatever the failures or compromises institutionalized in the U.S.
Constitution, Beer argued, architects like Jefferson, Madison, Frank-
lin, and Wilson turned their backs on the long Western tradition of
rule by the one or the few, who were supposedly gifted with superior
wisdom, virtue, or divine appointment, and proclaimed instead that
"we the people" are sovereign.19 Indeed, this insistence made the
conflict between England and its American colonies finally intracta-
ble. Whatever the commonalities, England on the whole continued to
assert that sovereignty belonged to parliament or the king-in-parlia-
ment.20 In contrast, the "enormous claim" of American republicans
"was that the many could act as this final judge and power."'z
The question about democracy, I will assume, asks for the moral
ground of popular sovereignty or, in the phrase Abraham Lincoln im-
pressed on our national memory, government "by the people. '22 I
will understand the sovereignty of the people to mean at least the fol-
lowing: (1) Every member of the political community is sovereign
over her evaluation or assessment of all actual or proposed activities
of the state and thus all political claims, in the sense that the state may
not legitimately stipulate that assessment,23 and (2) the final political
authority consists in the equal importance of every person's sovereign
assessment. Stated somewhat more briefly, then, popular sovereignty
means that all members of the political community have a right to
make or contest any political claim-that is, do so legitimately-and,
together as equals, they are the final political authority.
This definition is appropriate, because, among other reasons, it al-
lows an explication of why religious freedom is a sine qua non of dem-
ocratic rule. To be sure, exactly what freedom religious freedom
protects may seem so prone to divergent designations as to be incur-
19. SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
139-62 (1993).
20. Id. at 145-46.
21. Id. at 150.
22. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P.
Basler ed., 1946).
23. Here, "political claim" means a claim for the justice of any actual or proposed state activ-
ity or for the validity of any norm or principle of justice.
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ably vague. Still, a formal clarification fitting to present purposes is
possible. In its strict sense, a religion is a cultural system of concepts
and symbols and associated communal practices in terms of which or
through which adherents express a set of beliefs about the ultimate
context of human worth and, thereby, seek to inform all of their lives,
all they are and do, with a certain comprehensive commitment or ori-
entation. In sum, a religion is a cultural system with which adherents
cultivate or mediate a comprehensive self-understanding. I take so-
called world religions to be paradigmatic examples thereof, and many
participants in the discussion of politics and religion appear to use "re-
ligion" in something like this strict sense. 24 The freedom to adhere to
any religion one finds convincing is, then, essential to democracy, be-
cause a comprehensive commitment includes a belief about the ulti-
mate terms of political assessment, and each democratic citizen is
sovereign over her assessment of all political claims.
But it now follows that religious freedom protects a far wider class
of convictions than religious beliefs in the strict sense. Precisely be-
cause it may not violate the sovereignty of any citizen, the state must
be prohibited from teaching for or against any conviction about the
ultimate terms of political assessment, whether or not it belongs to the
kind of cultural system of beliefs and associated communal practices
of which the world religions are paradigmatic. For want of another
term, I will call all such protected beliefs "comprehensive assess-
ments," recognizing that, in some cases, such assessments will be in-
separable from other beliefs about the nature and destiny of human
beings and the nature of reality. We might also make the point by
using "religious" in a broad or extended rather than strict sense in
order to designate the class of convictions protected by religious free-
dom. On this extended constitutional meaning, any comprehensive
assessment is religious-and, in this sense, convictions are religious
that might in other contexts of discussion properly be called philo-
sophical beliefs, including secularistic worldviews, that define inclusive
moral orientations, all of which are also protected or legitimated, be-
cause democracy requires the sovereignty of every citizen over her
comprehensive assessment.
If these comments on democratic rule and religion give some preci-
sion to the question about democracy-that is, the question of what, if
anything, morally authorizes government by the people-they also ap-
24. Often, the designation of "religion" is further limited, such that cultural systems of the
kind I have described are religious only when the ultimate context of human worth is said to
include a transcendent reality-that is, something other than the world of temporally and spa-
tially located things and individuals.
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pear to imply something about the answer. Whatever else that answer
does or does not include, popular sovereignty can be morally permit-
ted or prescribed only if democracy is authorized by the ultimate
terms of political assessment and, thus, the ultimate source of worth in
human life. The validation of popular sovereignty, in other words, de-
pends on a valid comprehensive assessment-or, if "religious" is used
in the extended sense, the validation of democracy depends on a valid
religious conviction.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, let me note that I also use
"comprehensive assessment" here in an extended sense, at least in
contrast to what some other discussions of democratic theory may
suggest. I have in mind theories in the Kantian tradition, for instance,
the theory of Karl-Otto Apel or Alan Gewirth. 25 These accounts may
seem to validate democracy independently of any comprehensive as-
sessment, because they define universal moral principles indepen-
dently of the ends or goals we pursue and, thus, of any comprehensive
good. Typically, such theories ground democracy in a principle of uni-
versal or human rights, where the rights to be honored are not derived
from or dependent on an inclusive telos but, rather, define nonteleo-
logical constraints or limits on the purposes each person may elect-in
a manner roughly analogous to how grammatical norms constrain
what a language can be used to communicate. Kant himself defended
a categorical obligation to respect the freedom of every person to de-
termine her purposes.26 Gewirth, to cite one recent example, defends
a "Principle of Generic Consistency," which assumes that agents pur-
sue some or other ends and constrain those pursuits with the obliga-
tion to "[a]ct in accord with the generic rights [to freedom and well-
being] of your recipients as well as yourself, ' 27 so that justice in the
political sense is an application of this principle.
On my reasoning, the Kantian project is finally untenable, and valid
political assessments depend on a comprehensive good.28 Indeed, I
further believe that valid political principles depend on a divine pur-
pose. But neither of these beliefs circumscribes what I mean by the
25. See KARL-Orro APEL, SELECTED ESSAYS: VOLUME Two: ETHICS AND THE THEORY OF
RATIONALITY (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 1996); ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS
(1996).
26. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS (Thomas K. Abbott trans., 1949).
27. GEWIRTH, supra note 25, at 19 (emphasis omitted).
28. Briefly, my reasoning is as follows: Nonteleological principles imply that our purposes are
morally indifferent except in the respect that they do or do not honor the prescribed constraints.
But designating purposes as morally indifferent in some respects is itself a moral conclusion.
Thus, such principles also imply, against themselves, a moral evaluation of purposes in all re-
spects, and evaluating all purposes in all respects implies a comprehensive telos.
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class of comprehensive assessments. Just as secularistic philosophies
or worldviews provide for their adherents supreme moral orientations
or principles, so Kantian conceptions of human rights are said to iden-
tify the ultimate terms of political evaluation, and thus the latter are
also comprehensive evaluations in the politically relevant sense. Per-
haps the point can be made by saying that "comprehensive assess-
ment," as I intend the term, has the extended range given to the term
"comprehensive doctrine" by John Rawls, for whom Kantian liber-
alism is one such doctrine. 29
But the mention of Rawls also evokes a ready objection to saying
that democracy depends on a comprehensive backing. That state-
ment, the objection notes, makes democracy depend on a universal
moral principle or context for evaluation, at the least a principle of
human rights-and, in fact, moral universalism is a minority report in
recent thought, widely criticized as a misguided legacy of the Enlight-
enment.30 Many contemporary democratic theories are, as we may
say, post-Enlightenment, because they deny that political principles
require a universal backing and argue that democracy finds whatever
authorization it needs within the specific historical location or tradi-
tion in which it emerged.
In the later formulation of Rawls's own massively influential theory,
political liberalism derives its conception of justice from the distinct
political institutions and culture emergent within certain modern po-
litical communities, so that justice as fairness is "freestanding," be-
cause it is independent of any comprehensive doctrine.31 But another
illustration is found in the nuanced proposal recently offered by Jef-
frey Stout's widely discussed book, Democracy and Tradition.32 To be
sure, Stout claims, and is generally understood to present, a decided
alternative to Rawlsian liberalism. 33 Nonetheless, the two have this in
common: Both hold that democracy itself neither has nor requires
any moral ground beyond the principles or presuppositions located in
its own historicity, whether these are called, with Rawls, the values
latent within modern democratic culture or, with Stout, the demo-
cratic tradition and the norms of its distinctive discursive practices. 34
In either case, the question about democracy can be answered without
29. See generally RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 18.
30. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.
1984).
31. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 18, at 12.
32. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION (2004).
33. Id. at 183-202.
34. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 18, at 11-15; STOUT, supra note 32, at
63-117.
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explicating or implying any universal context of moral evaluation.
The relevant point here is as follows: Unless all theories on which
democracy can be morally authorized without universal principles are
untenable, validation of this governmental form cannot depend, as I
have asserted it does, on a comprehensive assessment.
To the best of my reasoning, however, theories of the kind exempli-
fied by Rawls and Stout defeat themselves. While the post-Enlighten-
ment persuasion in contemporary thought cannot be adequately
addressed in these reflections, I nonetheless believe that a more thor-
ough treatment would sustain the following critique: All accounts on
which democracy as a form of political community requires no univer-
sal moral ground are self-refuting; against themselves, they imply a
universal principle of evaluation. This follows because the absence of
universal principles anywhere entails their absence everywhere. By
the very nature of universality, in other words, the denial of such
grounds for democracy implies that political authorization everywhere
and always is solely historically specific. Hence, post-Enlightenment
views imply, against themselves, something like the following univer-
sal principle: Political norms everywhere and always are authorized
by conditions entirely peculiar to the given historical location or tradi-
tion. However odd this universal principle may appear, its affirmation
is nonetheless a comprehensive assessment, and thus a post-Enlight-
enment account tacitly affirms what it expressly denies. At least by
implication, so far as I can see, the question about democracy that
differing theories address is never whether democracy has a compre-
hensive moral ground, but only what that backing is.
That democracy cannot be authorized solely by historically specific
conditions is confirmed when every attempt to do so ends in a separa-
tionist meaning of religious freedom. Rawls's conception of justice as
freestanding implies that a democratic constitution separates these po-
litical principles from any comprehensive doctrine, as he makes clear
in his account of "public reason. ' 35 While Stout seeks so to define the
practice of democratic discourse that it welcomes appeal to compre-
hensive visions, whether religious or secularistic, his insistence that de-
mocracy itself depends on nothing except itself as a historically
specific tradition implies that constitutive norms of our democratic
practice are freestanding-independent of any given religious or secu-
laristic vision-and the constitutional principles are thereby separa-
tionist. But the religionist critique, reformulated for the theories we
35. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. 64 U. CH. L. REv. 765 (1997) [here-
inafter Rawls, Public Reason Revisited].
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are now considering, remains convincing. Any separation of political
principles, constitutional or otherwise, from comprehensive assess-
ments denies what all such convictions affirm-namely, that political
principles as such depend on a comprehensive backing-so that these
separationist accounts of the constitution in truth deny all comprehen-
sive assessments or do not legitimate any.36 Thus, the moral valida-
tion of democracy itself depends on some or other conviction of the
kind protected by religious freedom.
III. DEMOCRACY'S QUESTION
But, if this point has been secured, we are again faced with the ap-
parent problem in religionist accounts, which we may now recall by
noting how it finds expression in the iconoclastic reading of Steven D.
Smith.37 Smith argued that every conception of government and its
relation to religion implies a set of "basic background beliefs," which
we may take as his term for a comprehensive assessment. 38 On
Smith's reading, however, this recognition means that a principle of
religious freedom is impossible and the quest for it "foreordained to
failure," because, however the principle is defined, it will imply its
own background assessment and, thereby, take sides among the diver-
sity of religious and secularistic beliefs. 39
Reformulated in our present context, Smith's point concerns the
political constitution. Whatever else politics involves, its distinctive
task is to order or unify the political community, that is, to effect from
its diversity of people and associations action "as one. '40 A demo-
36. Although Stout welcomes appeals to religious and secularistic beliefs in democratic dis-
course, I have here called his proposal separationist, because it implies a democratic constitution
independent of any such belief. In respects relevant to the present discussion, however, Stout's
proposal may seem indistinguishable from Eberle's, and I earlier called Eberle a religionist. In
my earlier comments, however, I noted that Eberle simply assumes the adherence of all respon-
sible citizens "to characteristic liberal institutions and practices," and one might take this to
mean that he, too, separates constitutional principles from religious convictions. EBERLE, supra
note 4, at 59. I am persuaded, although an extended argument is needed to defend the point,
that we can confirm the standoff between recent separationists and religionists by showing how
representatives of each side turn out to be, by implication, examples of the opposing position. In
seeking neutrality through ultimate terms of political assessment independent of any religion,
separationists imply the establishment of a comprehensive assessment. In seeking to affirm re-
ligious freedom even while asserting the political importance of religious convictions, religionists
imply separationist constitutional principles.
37. See generally SMITH, supra note 2.
38. Id. at 63.
39. Id. at 15. Smith's discussion is principally critical, and he does not offer a sustained propo-
sal about how a democratic state properly relates to the religious or philosophical convictions of
its citizens.
40. BEER, supra note 19, at 151.
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cratic constitution unifies by defining the form or process of govern-
mental decision making that all citizens should observe, in a manner
roughly analogous to how a meeting requires commonly accepted
rules of order if pursuit of its business is to occur. Explicit adherence
to constitutional principles defines, we can say, the ethics of demo-
cratic citizenship or proper participation in action as one. But these
principles, Smith and I agree, imply some given comprehensive back-
ing, and its affirmation thereby belongs, if Smith's argument is sound,
to the ethics of citizenship. Hence, democracy cannot be coherently
neutral to all disagreements among religious and secularistic beliefs.41
Vexing as this problem may appear to be, there is a solution, which
can be approached by recalling the meaning of popular sovereignty;
namely, all members of the political community may legitimately
make or contest any political claim, and, together as equals, they are
the final political authority. If government by the people is so under-
stood, the meaning of "together as equals" and, thus, the way to ac-
tion-as-one can be the practice of full and free political discourse.
Political discourse, as I intend it, is the social practice of making and
assessing political claims for the purpose of determining which under-
standings should inform or be expressed in governing decisions.
When there are disagreements, the practice seeks to validate and in-
validate contested claims so that the state's activities may be deter-
mined by valid understandings. 42
41. If Smith is right, we could speak of neutrality toward all comprehensive assessments only
if the way to action as one represents a modus vivendi-that is, an accidental agreement expres-
sing what each of several parties takes to be its strategic advantage. In that event, however,
there are no constitutional principles in the sense that defines an ethics of citizenship.
42. My understanding of discourse is indebted to Jujrgen Habermas. for whom discourse is a
differentiated social practice in which we may engage when the coordination of action through
common acceptance of validity claims breaks down because of disagreements that we cannot
resolve routinely. In this practice, we suspend other purposes in order to assess by argument the
validity of contested claims. "Argumentation serves to focus on and test validity claims that are
initially raised implicitly in communicative action and are naively carried along with it." JORGEN
HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 158 (Christian Lenhardt &
Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990). Habermas also explains the practice in the following
way:
I shall speak of "discourse" only when the meaning of the problematic validity claim
conceptually forces participants to suppose that a rationally motivated agreement could
in principle be achieved, whereby the phrase "in principle" expresses the idealizing
proviso: if only argumentation could be conducted openly enough and continued long
enough.
JOROEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: VOLUME ONE: REASON AND
THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 42 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984). Given present pur-
poses, I will speak only of political discourse, although I do not intend that political claims ex-
haust those whose meaning allows one to speak of discourse. Also, I will extend the meaning of
political discourse among "we the people" to include all discussion and debate whose distin-
guishing purpose is to participate in determining activities of the state.
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"Full" political discourse, then, means that no political claim, in-
cluding any claim for a comprehensive assessment, is immune to con-
testation, and, when questioned, any political claim needs discursive
or argumentative redemption. In turn, "argumentative redemption"
of political claims means, summarily stated, the giving of reasons that
command acceptance of the claim by any citizen who understands the
argument; that is, acceptance is then required by the reason of any
such citizen. Validation in this sense is distinguished from a defense
that involves special pleading, because at least one of the considera-
tions or premises advanced is merely assumed or posited, so that ac-
ceptance of the claim is not rationally required for citizens who do not
grant the assumption. "Free" political discourse means that all have
equal standing in the political process, and validation is the proper
aim when disagreement occurs, precisely because the sovereignty of
each citizen's assessment is equal to that of any other in determining
how all will be ruled. Naturally, argumentative redemption, through
which at least a majority of citizens accept claims relevant to a given
political decision, is an ideal at which discourse aims, and factual limi-
tations, including difficulties of communication and the press of time
within which political decisions often must be taken, dictate that ac-
tual political discussion and debate typically falls far short. Still, a be-
lief or premise advanced as immune to argumentative assessment
because it must be merely assumed or posited improperly claims a
prior privilege in determining the state's activities and, thereby, denies
that the people rule together as equals.43
It then follows that a properly democratic constitution should do no
more and no less than provide the necessary conditions of common
action through full and free political discourse-or, as we may also
say, the necessary conditions of politics by the way of reason-and the
ethics of citizenship involves nothing more and nothing less than ad-
herence to this democratic way. I will not pause to argue for specific
constitutional provisions, but they include equal rights to certain pri-
vate liberties (for instance, the right to life, to control one's own body,
and to conscience) and to certain public liberties (for instance, the
right to free speech and assembly, to the franchise, to due process, and
43. In the end, a full political discourse must also be a free political discourse. The former
implies that the only relevant difference among claims is whether they can be validated by argu-
ment. But this is precisely what any constitutive limitation on the equality of all citizens denies.
The stipulation that only certain citizens-for instance, males or persons of wealth or special
circumstances of birth-may participate in the discourse, or that their assessments have greater
importance, grants political privilege to certain claims because of who makes them. But even if
"full and free political discourse" is redundant, clarity is served by making both characteristics
explicit.
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to equal protection of the laws). These rights define each citizen as
always a potential, and sometimes an actual, participant in full and
free political discourse. 44 Because the discourse is political or seeks to
order the community as a whole, the constitution must also provide
the institutions and offices of decision making through which discus-
sion and debate determine activities of the state, and the basic crite-
rion for this decision-making design is to maximize the measure in
which political outcomes are informed by full and free discourse
among "we the people."
Perhaps this proposal hardly seems consistent with full religious
freedom, because a constitution of the kind I have mentioned seems
clearly to exclude some possible religious or philosophical beliefs as
illegitimate. Given that democracy is only one possible form of gov-
ernment, this objection runs, provision of equal constitutional rights
expressly denies some possible comprehensive assessments-for in-
stance, those prescribing some form of aristocracy, patriarchy, or ra-
cist superiority. The ethics of democratic citizenship is, Smith might
say, an alien imposition on adherents of such comprehensive assess-
ments, and thus those beliefs are constitutionally delegitimated, and
the sovereignty of their adherents is violated. 45 But this objection re-
sults from failure to take in full measure the distinctive character of
full and free political discourse. Allegiance to argumentative adjudi-
cation is the one commitment that does not explicitly take sides in any
political conflict. Whatever disagreements citizens may have about
the civil order and its governance, common adherence to resolution
through discussion and debate does not explicitly bias the outcome.
Hence, adherence to full and free discourse is explicitly neutral even
to disagreement about whether this is the proper way to determine the
state's activities, because this disagreement also defines something
about which we can argue.
Discourse is distinguished by this neutrality to all political claims,
because commitment to the practice is expressed simply in the making
of any political claim, whatever its content. In this respect, making a
political claim is similar to making a promise. The act of promising
commits one to the conditions of this social practice, which include the
rule that promises should be kept. Similarly, anyone who claims valid-
ity for a political assessment, whatever the content for which one's
44. For a more extensive discussion of rights to private and public liberties, see FRANKLIN I.
GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE: JUSTICE AND THE REALITY OF GOD 196-223 (2000).
45. Indeed, if the objection is sound, the sovereignty of all citizens is violated, because the
sovereignty of any citizen includes her freedom to decide for the delegitimated comprehensive
assessments.
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claim is made, thereby commits herself to the conditions of political
discourse, which include the principle that valid claims can be, if con-
tested, validated by the giving of reasons. In sum, to make a political
claim is to pledge that the claim can be validated by argument and,
thereby, also to concede that one's claims can be invalidated in the
same way.
Against the objection, then, the ethics of democratic citizenship do
not explicitly deny any comprehensive assessment. To the contrary,
every citizen is invited to adhere to any religious or philosophical be-
lief she finds convincing and to advocate it by the way of reason. I will
call a political constitution founding government through full and free
discourse "formative" in character and, thereby, distinguish its provi-
sions from "substantive" political norms, principles, and proposals, in-
cluding claims for comprehensive assessments. The mark of a
formative provision is precisely that adherence to it is explicitly neu-
tral to all political conflicts, because this is nothing other than commit-
ment to politics by the way of reason. In contrast, a substantive claim
takes sides within one or more possible political disagreements.
But, whatever neutrality marks a formative constitution, some may
now contend, even it cannot escape the incoherence Smith's criticism
reveals. Even if full and free discourse does not explicitly deny relig-
ious or philosophical beliefs prescribing nondemocratic forms of gov-
ernment, it remains that democracy implies a comprehensive backing
or a set of background beliefs in terms of which the way of reason is
itself validated. Hence, the proposal offered here, as any theory of
government, takes sides by implication among comprehensive assess-
ments and, thereby, is inconsistent with full religious freedom.
Clearly, no form of government can be implicitly consistent with all
comprehensive assessments, simply because some of these are incon-
sistent with each other. Similarly, no social practice, even the practice
of discourse, can itself claim to be morally authorized without imply-
ing some ultimate substantive terms by appeal to which it can be vali-
dated. But what a democratic constitution explicitly asserts or
stipulates is one thing, and what it implies is something else. However
forceful Smith's analysis seems on first appearances to be, it depends
on ignoring this distinction. The difference is all-important, because
the entire purpose of a constitution explicitly neutral to all religious
and philosophical convictions is to establish the framework in which
activities of the state will be determined, insofar as possible, by princi-
ples of justice that argument can redeem. The entire purpose of a
formative constitution, we can say, is that full and free discourse
should discern and apply, insofar as possible, the substantive principle
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or principles and thus the comprehensive backing implied by the con-
stitution itself.
The point may also be marked in the following way: Because relig-
ious freedom prohibits an established comprehensive assessment, a
democratic constitution can establish only the comprehensive ques-
tion. Taking all implications into account, rule through full and free
discourse is constituted by nothing other than the question of what
comprehensive assessment is valid and how it should be applied in
particular governmental laws and policies. If we use "religious" in the
extended sense required by religious freedom, a democratic commu-
nity is constituted as nothing other than the religious question in its
pertinence to justice-and, in this sense, religious freedom is the very
meaning of democracy.
This is the question of democracy in its second sense, that is, the
question of democracy as democracy's question. Democracy's ques-
tion is the comprehensive question in its pertinence to justice, answers
to which are properly discussed and debated among "we the people"
in order that government may be maximally determined by political
assessments that argument can redeem. So, far from exile outside the
democratic process, religious or comprehensive assessments are essen-
tial to it. We may also say, then, that valid answers to both the ques-
tion about democracy and democracy's question depend on the valid
comprehensive assessment and thus on whatever, in truth, ultimately
grounds the worth of our common life. The comprehensive context
authorizing a democratic constitution can only be the very thing full
and free discourse is designed to make explicit and apply to activities
of the state.
Those activities, then, must be confined to specific or noncom-
prehensive norms and purposes ordering our common life-for in-
stance, laws and policies that define criminal activity and valid
contracts, regulate the economy, institutionalize educational opportu-
nity, control treatment of the natural environment, relate the nation
to the larger community of nations, fund the government itself, and so
forth. To be sure, such activities are themselves substantive political
assessments; that is, they explicitly affirm certain norms and purposes
as right or good and, thereby, explicitly take sides in specific political
disagreements. Moreover, the state has both the right and the duty to
teach its specific or noncomprehensive assessments, which means that
citizens should act in accord with the governing order. But citizens as
participants in political discourse are not thereby taught to accept spe-
cific laws and policies. While the people are bound to obey the law,
they are not bound to endorse it as members of "we the people," be-
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cause whether it articulates justice or, rather, should be transformed is
always subject to their sovereignty. Hence, the constitution should
prohibit the state from teaching anything about what comprehensive
assessment is valid, because the only distinct meaning any such teach-
ing could have is that citizens as political participants are bound to
deliberate in accord with it. In the political process, comprehensive
assessments can be explicit solely as objects of full and free discourse.
In other words, the difference between, on the one hand, specific or
noncomprehensive assessments that the government may enact and
pursue and, on the other, comprehensive assessments excluded from
activities of the state is what religious freedom constitutes as govern-
ment by the people.4
6
IV. THE RELIGIOUS OBJECTION
If enough has been said to outline this alternative account of politics
and religion, there remains what is the most fundamental objection to
it. For all that has been said, some will still find politics by the way of
reason inconsistent with religious freedom, because, on their reading,
this form of government explicitly excludes religions for which the
truth about our ultimate context is not open to rational validation. In
fact, many religions involve a second-order belief that their first-order
beliefs about reality and human worth cannot be argumentatively vali-
dated. The truth of these beliefs, it is said, transcends rational appre-
hension and is accessible only through submission to authority as
inherent in some tradition or institution or event of special revelation.
On the account offered above, therefore, the constitution does not
legitimate those comprehensive assessments or, what comes to the
same thing, the ethics of citizenship violates the sovereignty of citizens
by denying certain religions.47
Some who press this objection may insist on its importance, even if
they are not themselves religious adherents claiming to express truths
beyond rational validation. The relevant point, they may tell us, is
simply that certain religions do in fact make this claim, so that these,
too, must be legitimated if full religious freedom is endorsed. In the
last analysis, this consideration was significant to Rawls as he formu-
lated his later position. Political liberalism, he wrote, responds to the
following question: "How is it possible for those affirming a compre-
hensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, and in particular doctrines
46. This is how the requirement that state activities have a "secular purpose" should be under-
stood, although use of the term "secular" with this designation runs a considerable risk of
misunderstanding.
47. See GAMWELL, supra note 44.
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based on religious authority, such as the Church or the Bible, also to
hold a reasonable political conception of justice that supports a consti-
tutional democratic society?" 48
But the objection has merit only if religions for which final appeal
must be made to authority are in this respect right-that is, only if the
truth about our ultimate context is beyond rational validation, and
thus the comprehensive question is not a rational one. If, to the con-
trary, comprehensive assessments are open to discursive validation
and invalidation, then all convictions about ultimate terms of evalua-
tion are, whatever certain religions might say about their own beliefs,
answers to a rational question. It follows that every religion, when-
ever it explicitly or implicitly claims validity for its comprehensive as-
sessment in the political process, pledges in doing so that its claim can
be, if contested, redeemed by argument.
Given that the question is rational, constitution of the political com-
munity by the way of reason imposes nothing on any religion it does
not impose on itself in making a claim to validity-precisely as the
rule of promise keeping imposes nothing on a person that is not self-
imposed in making a promise. The act of promising is one's accept-
ance of an obligation to do what is promised, and this is so even if
what one promises is a deed one has no power to perform-in which
case, one engages in a practical self-contradiction, because the content
of what one says is inconsistent with its expression as a promise. If the
comprehensive question is rational, the act of making a political claim
for one's answer pledges that it can be, if contested, argumentatively
redeemed, and this is so even if what one asserts includes not only a
comprehensive assessment but also a denial that it can be rationally
validated-in which case the religious believer also engages in a prac-
tical self-contradiction. On this reading, then, a formative constitution
legitimates every religion in the only sense it can legitimate any;
namely, it invites each to argue for its terms of assessment within the
political discourse.
I will not seek here to settle whether the comprehensive question is
rational and, instead, will offer the following conclusion: Unless an-
swers to this question are open to argumentative validation and invali-
dation, democracy constituted by religious freedom cannot be morally
authorized, because it is an incoherent form of political community.
Given the sovereignty of every citizen over every political claim, there
can be no principle of political unity absent the possibility of discourse
inclusive of comprehensive assessments. Unless the plurality of such
48. Rawls, Public Reason Revisited, supra note 35, at 807 (emphasis added).
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beliefs can be embraced within public discussion and debate, political
conflict based on differing religious or philosophical convictions can-
not, in principle, be civilized, because there is nothing more basic to
which common appeal might be made. The only alternative, then, is
recourse to force, so that war is avoided only insofar as the distribu-
tion of strategic power yields a modus vivendi or, what is really a ver-
sion of the same thing, some are coerced into submission.
A standoff has occurred in both the public and academic debates
about politics and religion, because a common assumption, whether
acknowledged or not, has circumscribed the available alternatives,
namely, that religious grounds for political assessment cannot be argu-
mentatively tested. 49 As a consequence, the meaning of religious free-
dom has been left with equally problematic options. One side insists
that democracy is constituted as rule through public discussion and
debate, and, because religious convictions cannot be publicly debated,
concludes that finally they must be left outside the political process.
But political principles can be separated from all religions only if no
religion is true; thus, this separationist view of a democratic constitu-
tion is inconsistent with religious freedom, expressly denying what it
also purports to legitimate. The other side insists that justice is depen-
dent on a religious truth, and, because that truth cannot be rationally
validated, implies that democratic commitment requires submission to
authority. But this religionist view is inconsistent with religious free-
dom, because it implies the constitutional establishment of a religious
conviction.
Democracy makes sense only as politics constituted by the compre-
hensive question in its pertinence to activities of the state. Thereby,
the constitutional principle of religious freedom may be called separa-
tionist, but only because the state must be explicitly neutral to all re-
ligious and philosophical beliefs, and may also be called religionist,
but only because the comprehensive backing on which both the con-
stitution and the common good depend is the most basic concern of
discourse among "we the people."
Although this Article does not argue for conclusions in U.S. consti-
tutional law, it may be useful to recall that some principal architects of
this country's constitution were children of the Enlightenment, for
whom the people could be the final political authority, because the
ultimate terms of political assessment are accessible to reason. To be
sure, the 1787 Constitution profoundly compromised popular sover-
eignty, especially with respect to who counted as a sovereign citizen or
49. See supra notes 2-17 and accompanying text.
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even a person.50 At least in speech, if not in deed, however, the "ra-
tionalists," according to Sidney E. Mead, "concluded that reform de-
pended upon . . . opening all the channels of communication . . .so
that every opinion could have a hearing. Errors, they believed, would
cease 'to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict
them."' 51 Thomas Jefferson, above all others, expressed the point
with specific reference to religion. In his Notes on the State of Vir-
ginia, he wrote that "[r]eason and free inquiry are the only effectual
agents against error. Give a loose to them, they will support the true
religion by bringing every false one to their tribunal. '52 He gave the
same point unsurpassed statement when his Bill for Establishing Re-
ligious Freedom in Virginia was criticized as an invitation to irrecon-
cilable civil conflict: [T]ruth is great and will prevail if left to herself;
... she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has noth-
ing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed
of her natural weapons, free argument and debate . . . . 53
V. POLITICAL CONCERNS
My commendation of democracy as politics by the way of reason
may evoke specifically political concerns, and brief concluding com-
ments addressed to three of these may be useful. One involves the
actual equality of citizens. Although it may protect full religious free-
dom, some might object, a formative constitution is, in effect, at odds
with itself, because it stipulates too little. On this criticism, rights to
equal standing in political discourse are hollow or worthless without
access to certain substantive conditions. At the least, severe igno-
rance, illness, or poverty effectively prevent democratic participation.
A constitution confined to so-called civil rights and exclusive of cer-
tain social and economic rights does not take responsibility for what it
purports to provide and, thereby, is fraudulent, because it fails to rec-
ognize the basic needs that must be met if, indeed, all members of the
political community are to be together as equals.
But affirming that all have substantive economic and social rights
the state should secure is one thing, and stipulating those rights consti-
tutionally is another. That democracy itself will fail without substan-
tive justice does not entail that principles thereof should be
50. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2001).
51. MEAD, supra note 1, at 46.
52. THOMAS JEFFERSON, POLITICAL WRITINGS 394 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds.,
1999).
53. Id. at 391.
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constitutionally determined. Those who find a formative constitution
hollow are misled at least in part, I suspect, by equating the difference
between constitutional and statutory law with the difference between
the most important and less important legislation, whereby the basic
importance of certain substantive rights implies their constitutional
stipulation. With such stipulation, however, acceptance of the pro-
vided principles would belong to the ethics of citizenship, and they
would thereby be immune to contestation; that is, all political assess-
ments of all citizens should be consistent with them. In truth, there-
fore, substantive justice is too important to be constitutionally
defined, because no such definition can be valid unless it can be con-
tested and redeemed by argument. Hence, what popular sovereignty
requires us to say is this: A democratic constitution anticipates that
full and free political discourse will be, at least in tolerable measure,
successful and thus will, through statutory law, provide or promote for
all citizens the substantive conditions necessary to full political equal-
ity. Insofar as this anticipation is unmet, the political community is at
odds with its constitution, not the constitution with itself. Success in
the constituted political process cannot be constitutionally guaran-
teed, and this is simply to say that government by the people depends
entirely on the people.
A second possible concern notes the difficulties in discussing or de-
bating religious or philosophical convictions and thus the potential
harm of introducing them into the political process. To be sure, unit-
ing sovereign citizens through discourse does not imply that every po-
litical issue should be an occasion for explicit argument about
comprehensive assessments. For one thing, all political conflict is not
based on religious difference; disagreement may occur among citizens
who agree or can discover agreement about more general terms of
assessment but have divergent readings of the relevant facts or proba-
ble consequences of a given political decision. But, where conflict in-
volves fundamental commitments, some have argued, recourse to
them in politics can become an obstacle to salutary outcomes, pre-
cisely because they are so basic to the lives of adherents, so that de-
bate about or inclusive of them will not easily yield widely accepted
political solutions. On issues of public life, therefore, we are coun-
seled to seek an "overlapping consensus" or "incompletely theorized
agreement," whereby concurrence on specific political decisions is
achieved among citizens who assent on differing fundamental
grounds.5 4 But full and free discourse is completely consistent with
54. "Overlapping consensus" is Rawls's term, although he uses it, at least in the first instance,
to designate agreement on principles of justice independent of any comprehensive doctrine. See
1018 [Vol. 57:997
THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY1
the wisdom in this counsel, unless it is presented as a theory of democ-
racy, that is, unless it asserts freestanding or incompletely theorized
principles of justice as the meaning of religious freedom. Given popu-
lar sovereignty, in other words, there is no way in principle to exclude
the possibility of conflict that cannot be civilized without discourse
about the ultimate terms of political assessment. Finally, the people
themselves must decide when engaging in such discourse is wise.
These citizens may also agree that discourse about comprehensive
assessments best occurs outside more official institutions of political
decision making, such as legislatures or political caucuses and cam-
paigns. For the most part, the media, civic associations, educational
institutions, and the like may, by virtue of their distance from immedi-
ate particular decisions, facilitate more readily common reflection on
more inclusive beliefs about the public purpose. 55 In addition, formal
institutions of political rule are, perhaps, more easily dominated by
terms of assessment that become highly resistant to fundamental chal-
lenge, so that a vital informal realm of political discourse is typically
indispensable. 56 Still, there is no way in principle to restrict the set-
tings proper to religious or philosophical debate, because the judg-
ment about which claims are relevant on what occasions is one that
properly belongs to each democratic citizen as she participates in the
political process.
For all that, however, the third concern finds Jefferson's defense of
religious freedom romantic, because his vision-errors ceasing to be
dangerous as truth prevails in public discourse-seems hopelessly ide-
alistic or utopian. In fact, we will be told, politics in our republic is
largely a conflict of interests strategically pursued, where results are
consequences of bargaining in which disproportions of money and
other strategic forms of power give state sanction to injustice, and
what passes for discussion and debate is typically deceptive rhetoric or
systematically distorted communication. In response to this political
hermeneutics of suspicion, one may recall that architects of this coun-
try's governmental form were profoundly sensible of such political
corruption and sought to control it insofar as possible by institutional-
izing complicated decision-making procedures through which "we the
people" determine activities of the state. Whatever the faults of the
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 18, at 133-72. "Incompletely theorized agreement"
is a term used by Cass R. Sunstein. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 35 (1996).
55. See DAVID HOLLENBACH, S.J., THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 165 (2002).
56. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,
CONTESTATIONS 81-114 (2000).
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U.S. Constitution, its detailed provisions regarding the selection of of-
ficials and the separation of powers are attempts to minimize the mea-
sure in which strategic pursuit of interest would debase political
outcomes.
We might call this the realism of the U.S. Constitution, united with
the idealism expressed above all in the principle of religious freedom.
Still, the idealism cannot be hopeless. Unless the exercise of demo-
cratic rights includes some significant adherence to the way of reason,
that is, pursuit of truth as distinct from strategic interest, no decision-
making procedure, whatever its protections, can prevent its exploita-
tion by strategic power. In a famous dictum, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote
that our "inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary," but our
"capacity for justice makes democracy possible. ' 57 Constitutional re-
alism finds its warrant in the former half of this aphorism, and relig-
ious freedom assumes and calls us to exercise our capacity for justice.
This is just to repeat in another context that government by the people
depends entirely on the people, who are, on the democratic commit-
ment, "the last best hope of earth. '5 8
57. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A
VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENCE Xiii (1944).
58. LINCOLN, supra note 21, at 688.
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